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Abstract 
The Clean Air Act has assumed the central role in U.S. climate policy, directing the 
Environmental Protection Agency to develop regulations governing the emissions of greenhouse gases 
from existing coal-fired power plants. The cost and environmental effectiveness of policy options depend 
on abatement costs, the magnitude of emissions reduction opportunities, and the sensitivity of plant 
utilization. This paper examines the operation of electricity-generating units over 25 years to estimate the 
marginal costs and potential magnitude of emissions reductions that could result from improvements in 
their efficiency. We find that a 10 percent increase in coal prices causes a 0.2 to 0.5 percent heat rate 
reduction, broadly consistent with engineering assessments of abatement costs and opportunities. We also 
find that coal prices have a significant effect on utilization, but that effect will vary depending on the 
policy design. The results are used to compare cost-effectiveness of alternative policies.  
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Regulating Greenhouse Gases from Coal Power Plants  
under the Clean Air Act 
Joshua Linn, Erin Mastrangelo, and Dallas Burtraw 
1  Introduction 
There has been considerable debate over the costs and effectiveness of energy efficiency 
investments, such as improving fuel economy of passenger vehicles or retrofitting buildings with 
better-insulated windows. On the one hand, many estimates suggest that low-cost and even 
negative cost opportunities exist across the economy, where the market value of the energy 
savings outweighs the investment cost. On the other hand, many analysts are skeptical of these 
assertions, arguing that if such opportunities were available, firms and consumers would take 
advantage of them. 
Many of the optimistic estimates are based on case studies or engineering assessments of 
particular technologies. Previous analysis has identified several reasons why such assessments 
may be incomplete. First, there may be costs that the analyst does not observe and that hinder 
adoption. Second, technologies, particularly new ones, may be less effective than expected or not 
used as expected. Third, missing data on the extent to which the technologies have already 
entered the market may cause an overestimate of available efficiency opportunities. Fourth, there 
may be a rebound effect, in which adopting energy-efficient technology reduces its cost of 
operation and increases its use. Underestimating the rebound effect could lead to an overestimate 
of emissions reductions caused by technology adoption. For the most part, however, there is little 
direct evidence on these possibilities, and the controversy remains. 
Recent policy developments heighten this debate. Since a legislative approach to climate 
policy stalled in the U.S. Congress, the Clean Air Act (CAA) has assumed the central role in the 
development of regulations that will reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been developing performance standards—often, 
emissions rate standards—for many sectors of the economy, such as passenger vehicles and 
industrial sources. EPA is introducing performance standards for existing stationary sources, 
such as electricity generators and industrial facilities—an approach that is nearly unprecedented. 
Such standards raise the possibility of achieving carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions reductions 
rapidly, which is particularly important given the U.S. commitment to reduce emissions under 
the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. Coal-fired electricity generators account for about one-third of 
annual U.S. CO2 emissions. EPA estimates that 2 to 5 percent efficiency improvements may be 
achieved on average,
1 comparable to the annual emissions reductions expected from new 
efficiency standards for passenger vehicles sold from 2012 through 2016.2 The novelty and 
potential of these electricity sector standards raise two questions: (1) what are the available 
abatement opportunities; and (2) what are the costs of reducing emissions? Answering these 
questions requires addressing each of the issues above: estimating technological potential, costs, 
and the rebound effect. 
This paper focuses on existing coal-fired electricity generation units. We analyze the 
actual efficiency of the entire fleet of coal units in the United States, where efficiency is 
measured as electricity generated per unit of heat input. We assess abatement opportunities and 
costs by observing how market and regulatory incentives affect the energy efficiency of coal 
plants. We use the results to compare the cost-effectiveness of alternative energy efficiency 
policies.  
Previous approaches to these questions have used the case study or engineering approach, 
and this paper differs in two important ways. First, abatement costs and opportunities are 
estimated from observed behavior. Other studies, for example Metcalf and Hassett (1999) and 
Linn (2008), have analyzed the effect of fuel prices on energy efficiency in other sectors, but this 
                                                 
1 EPA (2008), p. 16. With no change in utilization, a 5 percent efficiency improvement would produce emissions 
reductions of 90 million tons per year, about 1.6 percent of total U.S. emissions in 2009. Drawing on estimates from 
Sargent & Lundy, L.L.C. (2009) that we discuss below, these reductions could be achieved at a cost of $10.74 to 
$63.91 per ton CO2 before accounting for the value of saved energy.  
2 This estimate is calculated by taking the 992 million tons in cummulative emissions reductions expected from 
pasenger vehicles introduced between 2012 and 2016 
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is the first study on the electricity sector. Second, as we explain next, heterogeneous abatement 
costs and opportunities across generators play an important role in the policy comparisons, and 
we incorporate this heterogeneity in a manner that is internally consistent with the empirical 
analysis. 
We first assess abatement opportunities from efficiency improvements by examining 
heterogeneity in the efficiency of existing coal units. The analysis is performed using a unique 
panel data set of coal-fired generation units for the years 1985–2009. The data include monthly 
fuel input, generation, and coal prices by generation unit for nearly all U.S. coal plants, and the 
units in the sample account for 95 to 98 percent of total coal generation in each year. We use a 
generation unit’s heat rate (the ratio of heat input to electricity generated) to measure efficiency; 
heat rate is approximately proportional to the rate of CO2 emissions per unit of electricity 
generation.  
We show that there is considerable heterogeneity and a substantial right-hand (positive) 
tail in the heat rate distribution. Specific technical factors help explain heterogeneity across units, 
including boiler design, size, and vintage, and features such as pollution control equipment and 
cogeneration. After controlling for these factors, we find that fleetwide emissions rate reductions 
of up to 5 percent may be technically feasible without changing the amount of electricity 
generated with coal. This estimate does not account for costs, and we consider it an upper bound, 
given current technology. 
To provide the basis for comparing the costs of alternative policies, we next estimate the 
cost of improving efficiency and the rebound effect. In principle, several types of policies could 
be used to incentivize heat rate improvements, and the costs may vary across the alternatives. We 
compare the costs of four policy alternatives: a traditional (inflexible) performance standard, a 
flexible performance standard, and two types of emissions taxes. To make this comparison we 
observe that (1) cost-effectiveness depends largely on abatement costs and the rebound effect; 
and (2) coal prices mimic the incentives created by a CO2 emissions price (i.e., an emissions cap 
or tax) or some types of performance standards. Demonstrating the first point requires a brief 
description of the policies. A traditional emissions rate standard sets a particular emissions rate 
per unit of generation (or per unit of heat input) for each generator to meet. Units that decrease Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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heat rates to meet the standard also experience a rebound effect because the lower heat rate 
reduces the cost of generating electricity.3 
A flexible emissions rate standard sets a benchmark emissions rate and allows firms to 
overcomply and sell credits to firms that undercomply. The standard creates incentives to adopt 
energy efficiency technology and has two effects on generation: it imposes an opportunity cost 
on heat rates by effectively adding to the cost of fuel, and it provides an output subsidy through 
the allocation of credits based on generation. The opportunity cost provides a disincentive for 
generation while the output subsidy provides an incentive to increase generation. Hence, like the 
traditional standard, the flexible standard creates incentives to adopt energy efficiency 
technology, but unlike the traditional standard the effect of the flexible standard on generation is 
ambiguous.  
A CO2 emissions or fuel tax raises the cost of using fuel, thereby creating an incentive to 
adopt energy efficiency technology. This also creates an incentive for firms to reduce generation. 
The emissions or fuel tax raises the cost of using fuel and therefore creates the smallest rebound 
effect; the emissions or fuel tax would require the smallest overall reduction in heat rates to 
achieve a given emissions target. In short, the relative cost-effectiveness of the policies depends 
on the cost of improving heat rates and the magnitude of the rebound effect. 
Because data on energy efficiency technology adoption are not available, we focus on the 
response of heat rates to changes in coal prices. As we argue below, conditional on the utilization 
of the unit, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the level of energy efficiency 
technology and the unit’s heat rate. A simple model demonstrates that we can estimate the cost 
of adopting technology by examining the empirical relationship between coal prices and heat 
rates. Similarly to the CO2 policies, an increase in the price of coal increases the opportunity cost 
for heat rates, conditional on utilization. Using the same panel data set as for the analysis of 
abatement opportunities, we find that a 10 percent coal price increase, corresponding to a tax on 
CO2 emissions of about $1.64 per ton, reduces heat rates by 0.2 to 0.5 percent, depending on the 
estimation procedure. A change in coal prices commensurate with a $10 per ton tax on CO2 
emissions would stimulate a 1 to 3 percent heat rate reduction (holding fixed utilization). This 
range of estimates encompasses the estimates suggested in the engineering literature but includes 
the possibility of somewhat lower costs than have been estimated. We note that the overall 
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efficiency improvements of 2 to 5 percent discussed in the engineering literature correspond to 
the change in heat rate resulting from an increase in coal prices of more than two standard 
deviations—that is, out of sample. We also obtain a significant relationship between coal prices 
and utilization. A 10 percent increase in coal prices reduces utilization by 2 to 4 percent.  
We use a stylized model of the electricity sector to simulate the effects of four energy 
efficiency policies: a traditional emissions rate standard, a flexible standard, a coal Btu tax 
(roughly equivalent to a coal emissions tax), and a fossil fuel emissions tax. We find that because 
of the narrower focus of the performance standards and the greater rebound effect, more 
investment in heat rate technology is required under the performance standards than the taxes to 
achieve a given emissions reduction. This raises the relative costs of the standards, but overall, 
the costs approximate the engineering estimates and are low compared with other abatement 
opportunities in the electricity sector. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background on the 
regulation of existing coal units under the CAA. Section 3 discusses the operation of coal-fired 
units in the U.S. electricity system. Section 4 describes the data and summarizes heterogeneity in 
the heat rates across individual units. We identify some of the factors that might influence 
efficiency and quantify abatement opportunities. Section 5 describes the empirical strategy for 
estimating the effects of coal prices on heat rates and utilization, and Section 6 presents the 
estimation results. Section 7 uses the estimation results to compare cost-effectiveness across 
policies, and Section 8 concludes. 
2  The Clean Air Act  
The modern CAA was passed in 1970 and conveys broad authority to EPA to develop 
regulations to mitigate harm from air pollution. In 2007 the Supreme Court affirmed this 
authority with respect to the regulation of GHGs (Massachusetts v. EPA).
4 Subsequently, the 
agency made a formal, science-based determination that GHGs are dangerous to human health 
and the environment. This ―endangerment finding‖ compelled the agency to mitigate that harm.  
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In 2011 EPA implemented regulations affecting CO2 emissions from passenger vehicles, 
medium-duty trucks, and heavy-duty trucks.5 The agency also implemented regulations for 
construction permitting (New Source Review, NSR) for major new and modified sources, such 
as power plants and industrial facilities.6 The third anticipated EPA regulatory action is the 
development of performance standards for GHGs affecting the operation of stationary facilities.
7 
EPA has a long history of setting performance standards for new sources, but performance 
standards for existing sources are nearly unprecedented.
8 The first standards, expected in 2012, 
will target steam boilers at power plants fueled with coal, oil, and natural gas, along with 
petroleum refineries. These sources represent more than one-third of GHG emissions in the 
United States (EIA 2011). 
In principle, power plants and refineries could reduce emissions in many ways, including 
fuel switching, making incremental changes to efficiency, or adopting new, energy-efficient 
technology. Indications from EPA (2008) are that the regulations will encourage improvements 
in the efficiency of power plants and refineries without requiring large-scale substitution among 
fuels or technologies. The efficiency of facilities varies substantially, possibly indicating 
potential opportunities for improvements at the least efficient facilities. EPA suggested that 
average efficiency might be improved by 2 to 5 percent at moderate cost.
9 However, one might 
conjecture that incentives already exist to reduce costs at these facilities, and the presence of 
heterogeneity across plants might reflect variation in technological, geographic, and economic 
factors that make operational improvements more expensive in some situations. To date, there 
has been no comprehensive examination of the actual opportunities for efficiency improvements, 
or the magnitude and cost of potential emissions reductions.  
                                                 
5 Beginning with model year 2012, average fuel economy of cars and light trucks improves by 5 percent per year to 
a fleet average of 35.5 miles per gallon (mpg) in 2016. New regulations are expected to extend this target to 54.5 
mpg by 2025. 
6 Implementing regulations including the definition of best available control technology are in development. 
7 Standards under §111(b) of the CAA apply to new sources (these are termed New Source Performance Standards), 
and those under §111(d) apply to existing sources. 
8 Existing sources regulated under other provisions of the CAA are not eligible for regulation under §111(d) 
(Richardson et al. 2011). 
9 Equivalent additional reductions could be achieved if facilities were allowed to co-fire with biomass under the 
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3  Coal Plant Operations 
At a simplified level, a coal-fired power plant consists of one or many boilers that burn 
pulverized coal to produce steam from water. The boilers are connected to one or many 
generation turbines, which spin from the pressure of the steam to produce electricity. A 
condensing and cooling system collects and recycles the steam. 
3.1  Determinants of Efficiency 
Efficiency is often measured by the heat rate—the amount of heat input, in million 
British thermal units (mmBtu), required to generate one megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity. A 
lower heat rate represents a more efficient unit. A generating unit can improve efficiency by 
reducing the amount of fuel required for a specific level of generation. A percentage 
improvement in heat rate is nearly equivalent to an equal percentage improvement in the 
emissions rate in terms of the change in CO2 emissions.10 The difference stems from the small 
variation in carbon per Btu across varieties of coal. 
The heterogeneity in heat rates across coal-fired generation units can partly be explained 
by technical characteristics determined at the time of plant construction that cannot be changed 
without a major overhaul. This category includes size, age, firing type, and the technology 
employed. Higher efficiency is generally associated with plants that are used more heavily 
because efficient units are less costly to operate. 
A second factor is how the boiler is used. The relationship between the heat rate and 
utilization is nonlinear, as efficiency tends to be lower at very low and very high levels of 
utilization. Routine decisions regarding plant operations affect efficiency, and many of these 
decisions result from constraints or factors that weigh against efficiency concerns (e.g., variation 
in demand, voltage regulation, or system reliability). Units with lower utilization may be ramped 
up and down more frequently, which requires additional fuel input as temperature in the boiler 
fluctuates. The result could involve efficiency losses at least partly outside the control of plant 
decisionmakers.  
                                                 
10 The product of the rate of emissions per mmBtu and the heat rate gives the rate of emissions per MWh. For 
example, combustion of Powder River Basin low-sulfur subbituminous coal emits about 212.7 lb CO2 per mmBtu of 
heat content. A plant with a heat rate of 10 mmBtu/MWh has a CO2 emission rate of about 2,127 lb CO2/MWh 
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Plant managers control several other factors that affect heat rates. Techniques, 
management, or technology may improve the efficiency of the plant by targeting the major 
components of the coal combustion process: oxygen, temperature, and pressure. Excessive 
deviations in any of these areas may decrease efficiency through waste or shortfalls. For 
example, Beer (2007) and Rosen and Dincer (2003) explain that enhanced coal-feeding systems 
or grinding the coal more finely can reduce excess air in the boiler and increase efficiency by 
reducing heat loss. Maintenance and performance testing are also critical for identifying and 
preventing losses.  
Although technical adjustments can be made to improve heat rate, a firm’s institutions, 
such as training or commitment to goals, are also important. Industry experts identify as potential 
barriers weak support from management and a lack of expertise or onsite engineers dedicated to 
heat rate improvement (DOE/NETL 2009). 
Regulations can also affect a firm’s heat rate. Some measures that improve efficiency 
may trigger New Source Review, under which the firm must demonstrate that the efficiency 
improvement would not create or exacerbate air quality violations. NSR can raise the cost of 
improving efficiency if the firm has to install pollution abatement equipment. In addition, the 
market environment may influence investment and operational behavior of firms. Firms subject 
to greater competition in wholesale power markets may have greater awareness of and incentive 
to minimize costs (Fabrizio et al. 2007). Firms may vary in their ability to access capital when 
investment opportunities exist. 
Table 1 describes factors that affect heat rates and hypotheses from the literature on how 
the factors affect heat rates. Appendix 1 includes a more complete literature review. 
3.2  Engineering Estimates of Costs and Heat Rate Improvements 
According to an engineering analysis prepared for EPA, the cost of reducing heat rates 
varies widely across options (Sargent & Lundy 2009). In one example, for a 200-MW unit, 
cleaning the condenser improves heat rates up to 0.07 mmBtu/MWh and costs a modest $30,000 
per year.11 Accounting for utilization and coal prices, this would be profitable for a typical 200-
MW unit in 2008. Other improvements may be less cost-effective, however. A new fan system to 
                                                 
11 The range of identified reductions could be achieved at a cost of $10.74-$63.91 per ton of CO2 before accounting 
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control air flow in the flue gas system can cost $6 million in capital investment plus $50,000 per 
year in operating and maintenance costs for heat rate reductions up to 0.05 Btu/kWh for a 200-
MW unit.  
Each potential measure at a typical plant improves the heat rate between 0.01 and 0.1 
mmBtu/MWh (compared with an average heat rate of about 11 mmBtu/MWh) and 
improvements may be additive. Importantly, significant analysis and expertise are required to 
find the optimal combination of upgrades and techniques, if any, for each specific plant. There 
are no comprehensive data, however, on the extent to which such technologies are already in use.  
4  Data and Summary Statistics 
To study the efficiency of coal-fired power plants, we assemble a comprehensive annual 
panel data set of coal-fired generating units in the United States from 1985 through 2009. The 
dataset combines several public sources and contains a uniquely detailed set of characteristics 
and efficiency of coal-fired units over time. Because of data limitations, 2006 and 2007 are 
excluded from the panel. Appendix 2 provides further information about data sources.  
The annual heat rate is calculated from reported monthly heat input and generation at a 
boiler and corresponding generator. Because some units fire multiple fuels, heat input from fuels 
other than coal is included in the calculation of heat rate; however, close to 99 percent of total 
annual heat input is from coal in any given year in the panel. Each year contains about 1,000 
units, although the sample size is somewhat larger after 2001 because of changes in the reporting 
requirements of the primary data source. The sample contains about 340 gigawatts (GW) of 
capacity and accounts for 97 percent of U.S. coal-fired electricity generation and emissions in 
2009.  
Although we do not observe heat rate investments in the data, the data set includes other 
variables that influence heat rate. Characteristics of the plant, such as vintage, size, boiler firing 
type, and cogeneration capacity, help determine the unit’s physical ability to achieve a particular 
level of efficiency. We also include variables that describe how the plant is used and managed. 
These include utilization rates, the presence of pollution controls, choice of fuel including coal 
type, regulatory environment, and ownership structure. Finally, we merge plant-by-year prices of 
the delivered price of coal. Note that the coal price is the annual average price of coal because it 
is calculated by dividing expenditure by heat content of the delivered coal. Most of the analysis 
uses the overall price of coal, including contract and spot market purchases, and some of the 
analysis includes contract and spot market prices separately. Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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Table 2 and Figures 1–3 summarize the data. Table 2 aggregates the data to five-year 
time periods and reports means of several variables with standard deviations in parentheses. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of heat rates in 2008. The horizontal axis is the average annual 
heat rate and the vertical axis is the heat input, which maps into the unit’s electricity generation. 
The figure displays a right-hand tail, indicating that many of the least efficient units have 
relatively little electricity generation. Figure 2 disaggregates the data and illustrates differences 
in heat rates across three prominent firing types. Figure 3 reports the distribution of heat rates 
after controlling for several characteristics, including firing type, cogeneration, capacity and fuel 
type. More specifically, the figure plots the residuals of a regression of the unit’s heat rate on the 
indicated control variables; the variables are added sequentially to generate the different plots (in 
each case, the sample mean heat rate is added to the residuals before plotting). Even after 
accounting for these characteristics, one observes substantial heterogeneity, which is the focus of 
our analysis.  
We use the observed heat rate heterogeneity to place an upper bound on the available 
abatement opportunities. For this calculation, we put aside abatement costs and consider what 
levels of abatement—that is, percentage emissions reductions—would be possible under 
alternative traditional performance standards. We first consider a uniform standard equal to the 
90th percentile of efficiency (corresponding to the 10th percentile of heat rates) and calculate the 
percentage emissions reduction across all units in the sample. This calculation implicitly assumes 
that it is technically feasible for all units to achieve a heat rate equivalent to the most efficient 
10th percentile, but this may not be possible for some units whose inherent features, such as 
firing type, size, or other characteristics, are inflexible. Therefore, we also analyze traditional 
standards that are set according to the firing type or other attributes of the generation unit that 
cannot be changed. 
Table 3 reports the results of these calculations. Each column reports a different 
performance standard that is determined according to the generator attributes in the column 
heading. In Panel A we assume that the standard does not affect utilization, and in Panel B we 
assume a 20 percent rebound effect (as estimated below). We find that the percentage emissions 
reduction is about 5 to 6 percent assuming no rebound effect, and 5 percent assuming a 20 
percent rebound effect. Somewhat surprisingly, the reductions are fairly insensitive across the 
different columns. Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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5  Strategy for Estimating the Effects of Coal Prices on Heat Rates and 
Utilization 
5.1  A Firm’s Choice of Heat Rate  
The cost of fuel input creates an incentive for firms to adopt heat rate-improving 
technology. Most technology options involve capital cost expenditures, such as an economizer 
and/or acid dew point control to transfer heat from exhaust gases, but there are also variable cost 
opportunities, such as cleaning the condenser. Ideally, we could estimate the cost of adopting 
such technology by investigating empirically the relationship between coal prices and technology 
adoption. However, because data on technology adoption are not available, we instead focus on 
the effect of coal prices on heat rates, which are expected to change with technology adoption. 
This presents the challenge that heat rates are not fixed for a given heat rate technology, and in 
fact heat rates depend on utilization, as discussed above. However, if we condition the analysis 
on utilization, there is a direct relationship between heat rate technology and heat rate. That is, if 
two units have the same utilization but different heat rates (and are otherwise identical), they 
have a different heat rate technology; we refer to the unit with the lower heat rate as having a 
―better‖ heat rate technology. Figure 4 plots heat rates against the utilization for two levels of 
heat rate technology, T. The figure shows that if the units have the same utilization, the unit with 
the lower heat rate has the better technology. Therefore, we proceed with a model in which the 
firm chooses heat rates and characterize the effect of coal prices on heat rates, conditional on 
utilization. Subsequently, we allow utilization to vary, which introduces a rebound effect. 
To begin, we argue that abatement costs can be estimated from the relationship between 
coal prices and heat rates. We assume a facility operator makes a decision about heat rate to 
maximize profit. We posit a reduced-form relationship between utilization (electricity generation 
per unit of capacity) and operating costs:  ( , )
f u u p h   , where 
f p is the price of fuel 
($/mmBtu), h is the heat rate (mmBtu/MWh),   is the unit’s type,  1 0 u  , and  2 0 u  . The term 
f ph  is the fuel cost per unit of electricity generation. A lower heat rate reduces fuel costs and 
raises utilization. The unit’s type captures factors that affect generation other than fuel costs, 
such as managerial quality, as well as the unit’s idiosyncratic economic value due to its location 
in the transmission system; higher type is associated with greater utilization. We use the reduced-
form utilization function to focus the analysis on the firm’s choice of heat rate. Alternatively, we 
could embed the coal unit in a competitive wholesale electricity market, where we would 
conclude similarly that utilization is a function of type and fuel costs.  
   Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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The profit maximization problem is 
  max [ ] ( , ) ( )
ff
h p m p h u p h K c h K        (1) 
 
where:
= price of electricity ($/MWh)
operation and maintenance costs ($/MWh)
capacity (MW)









The term in brackets is the difference between the electricity price and operating costs, which 
include operations and maintenance costs as well as fuel costs.12 The function  () chis the capital 
cost of choosing heat rateh; a lower heat rate is more costly.13 The capital cost scales linearly 
with the unit’s capacity.  
The first-order conditions for the facility’s problem can be represented as 
 
( , )
[ ] '( ) 0
f
ff u p h
p m p h p u c h
h
 
    

  (2) 
We interpret       as the marginal cost of reducing the heat rate. Equation (2) shows that, 
conditional on utilization ( 0 u
h
   ), high coal prices are associated with low heat rates.  
5.2  Estimating the Effect of Coal Prices on Heat Rates 
We are interested in two relationships: (1) the effect of coal prices on investment in 
efficiency improvements and efficiency; and (2) the effect of coal prices on utilization. We begin 
by focusing on the average effect of coal prices on efficiency. We use the full panel data set and 
a linear regression model in which heat rate is the dependent variable that measures efficiency, 
and the major independent variables are coal prices and unit characteristics. 
Ideally, to estimate the effect of coal prices on efficiency investments and efficiency, we 
would have data on specific improvements made at individual plants. Because such data are not 
                                                 
12 For simplicity, the utilization function does not include natural gas prices and operations and maintenance costs. 
These assumptions are relaxed in the empirical work. 
13 The large majority of opportunities to reduce heat rates at coal plants are capital cost related (Sargent & Lundy 
2009). Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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available, we introduce further structure by assuming that the first term in equation (2) is small 
compared with the other terms (this assumption is supported by empirical estimates of the 
derivative of utilization to the heat rate, below, which do not depend on this assumption). Taking 
logs of equation (2) yields the following relationship between the heat rate of unit   in time   and 
the price of coal: 
  ln ln
f
it it it it h pX    ò   (3) 
where     is a vector of characteristics including state and time fixed effects, utilization, and a 
large number of unit-specific variables. The coefficients   and   are to be estimated, and     is a 
random error term.  
Because equation (3) uses a log-linear relationship between coal prices and efficiency, we 
can interpret   as the elasticity of the heat rate to the coal price. Based on equation (2), we 
expect that high coal prices increase the incentive to adopt technology that improves efficiency 
and reduces heat rates, so   should be negative. Importantly for the policy comparison below, 
equation (2) suggests that   is inversely proportional to the marginal cost of reducing the heat 
rate.  
The extent to which this predicted relationship will be observed at individual units 
depends on unit-specific characteristics and other factors, including the assumption that the firm 
minimizes costs. If the firm does not minimize costs perfectly, the data should reveal a relatively 
weaker relationship between heat rates and fuel price for generating units owned by that firm. 
Hence, the economic relationship observed in the data may underestimate how firms would 
respond to regulations requiring an improvement in emissions rates or heat rates. 
The theoretical model and discussion of the data and power plant characteristics illustrate 
three major challenges to estimating equation (3): reducing measurement error in heat rates, 
controlling for utilization, and controlling for the unit’s type (    . The measured heat rates are 
quite noisy, occasionally falling outside engineering bounds (see Appendix 1 for more details). Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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To reduce measurement error for heat rates we aggregate observations to five-year periods. Each 
unit is observed a maximum of five time periods over the sample 1985–2009.14 
An increase in coal prices decreases utilization because it makes the relative cost of 
operating coal plants more expensive. The decreased utilization raises heat rates, for reasons 
discussed earlier. Failing to control for utilization would bias the estimate of   toward zero; that 
is, a simple regression of heat rates on coal prices would combine the positive effect of a change 
in utilization with the negative effect of a change in efficiency. Since we are interested in the 
latter, it is important that we control for the effect of coal prices on heat rates due to utilization.  
Equation (3) includes an extensive set of controls for utilization. The relationship 
between coal prices and utilization may be nonlinear; that is, including a linear measure of 
utilization would imperfectly control for utilization and would bias other estimated coefficients. 
Therefore, we include a linear control for utilization, as well as a large set of variables that 
account for the potentially nonlinear relationship between utilization and efficiency, particularly 
at low levels of utilization. Utilization controls in     include the unit’s utilization rate 
(generation divided by the maximum generation over the time period if the unit operates at full 
capacity). We also include a set of fixed effects for the number of months in the five-year period 
that the unit operated below 10 percent or below 30 percent of rated capacity. These control 
variables were selected based on an analysis of hourly data, in which we concluded that these 
monthly utilization variables predicted heat rates nearly as well as hourly utilization variables. 
The results are unaffected if we use high-order polynomials in utilization rather than the 
utilization fixed effects.  
Note that aggregating to five-year periods also helps control for the effect of coal prices 
on heat rates due to utilization. It takes time for firms to implement heat rate improvements in 
response to higher coal prices. For example, they may have to hire engineering consultants or 
approve and implement capital projects. Using five-year intervals rather than annual observations 
                                                 
14 There may also be measurement error in the independent variables such as utilization or coal prices. If generation 
is measured with error, the estimates would be biased because generation is used to construct the unit’s heat rate and 
utilization. This does not appear to be a significant concern, however, because the results are similar if we use the 
unit’s fuel input as the dependent variable rather than the heat rate. In principle, we could address potential 
measurement error in coal prices using an instrumental variables approach, but as noted below, we are not able to 
identify suitable instruments for the unit’s coal price. Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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allows us to more plausibly capture the effect of coal prices on heat rate improvements, rather 
than the effect of coal prices on heat rates due to changes in utilization.15 
In Section 5.1 we assumed that utilization depends on fuel prices and heat rate. In 
practice, other variables affect utilization and therefore heat rates, particularly natural gas prices. 
However, controlling for utilization in equation (3) avoids the need to include other variables 
that affect heat rates via utilization; below we show that the results are similar if we control for 
natural gas prices and other determinants of utilization.16 
The final empirical challenge is the relevance of the unobserved type (  ). We assume a 
unit with a higher type would have a higher efficiency, independent of its other unit-specific 
characteristics (      the coal price, or its utilization. For example, the plant or firm may have 
better managers, or the unit may operate with less variation in its utilization rate. Thus, the unit’s 
type may contain a fixed and time-varying component. This introduces a significant challenge 
because the unit’s type is not directly observed in the data. 
Perhaps the simplest approach to controlling for fixed unit type would be to include unit 
fixed effects in equation (3). However, as we show below, this absorbs much of the coal price 
variation and makes it difficult to identify  . Below, we show results that control for fixed unit 
characteristics by including the variables for the technical characteristics that were analyzed 
earlier: state, rated capacity, firing type, primary fuel type, and whether the unit is a 
cogenerator.17 As an alternative specification, we include fixed effects for each generating unit.  
We take several approaches to controlling for time-varying components of the unit’s 
type. The utilization variables control for type to the extent that high-type units have higher 
utilization rates because they are more efficient; that is, there is a monotonic relationship 
between type and utilization (Olley and Pakes 1996). Several other included variables are likely 
to be correlated with type: age, percentage of coal in total heat input (to account for units that use 
                                                 
15 Alternatively to aggregating to five-year time periods, we could use annual data and include the moving average 
of the coal price rather than the current coal price. The results are unaffected if we take this approach; we prefer 
aggregation because of the concerns about measurement error discussed above. 
16 There may be an interaction between natural gas prices and coal prices. A coal plant that faces high coal prices 
and low natural gas prices would have an even greater incentive to reduce its heat rate than if natural gas prices were 
higher. We find evidence for this mechanism during the sample period. 
17 More specifically, the control variables include a set of fixed effects for the unit’s firing type and fuel type. 
Deciles are computed for rated capacity across the units in the sample, and equation (3) includes fixed effects for 
each decile. Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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a small amount of natural gas or biomass), ownership type, and whether the unit has selective 
catalytic reduction (for nitrogen oxides) or flue gas desulfurization (for sulfur dioxide).18 The 
ownership type fixed effects control for the fact that different ownership types may have 
different incentives to improve heat rates. We also report results from a specification that 
includes parent company by time period fixed effects, which control for changes over time in 
management quality at the parent company level. 
Given the control variables included in equation (3), the main remaining concern is that 
coal prices may be correlated with omitted, particularly time-varying, unit characteristics, even 
after conditioning the analysis on utilization. In particular, coal markets are not perfectly 
competitive (Busse and Keohane 2004), and certain owners of coal plants may be able to 
negotiate more favorable prices. This could result in a negative correlation between the 
unobserved type and the observed coal price. In the estimation we take several approaches to 
address this possibility, such as including parent company fixed effects.19  
5.3  Estimating the Effect of Coal Prices on Utilization 
To estimate the rebound effect stemming from an improvement in heat rate, we assume 
that a 1 percent decrease in coal prices has the same effect on utilization as a 1 percent decrease 
in heat rate. Because marginal generation costs depend on the product of the coal price and the 
heat rate, this is a reasonable assumption, given the importance of marginal generation costs in 
determining utilization. Therefore, we are interested in the effect of coal prices on utilization, 
holding heat rates constant. We estimate the reduced-form utilization function by assuming a 
log-linear relationship between utilization and the price of coal: 
  ln ln
f
it it it it u p X    ò   (4) 
The dependent variable is the log of utilization, and the independent variables are the same as in 
equation (3), except that we omit the utilization controls. The main challenge to estimating 
equation (4) is that utilization and heat rate are jointly determined; that is, changes in coal prices 
affect both heat rates and utilization rates. Ideally, we would add heat rate to equation (4) and 
                                                 
18 Equation (3) includes a set of age fixed effects, for 6-10 years, 11-20 years, 21-30 years, 31-40 years, 41-50 years, 
51-60 years and above 60 years, where 0-5 years is the omitted category. 
19 In principle, one could instrument for the price of coal using variables that are correlated with coal prices but not 
with the error term in equation (3). We have considered a number of potential instruments, for example, coal prices 
observed at neighboring plants owned by other firms, but we have not found variables that meet both requirements. Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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jointly estimate equations (3) and (4), but appropriate instrumental variables are not available. 
Instead, we use annual observations rather than five-year intervals to reflect the short-term nature 
of variable costs and system operation. We note that the estimate of   in equation (4) may be 
biased if heat rates respond to coal prices within one year. However, the magnitude of the bias is 
likely to be small in practice because coal prices have a small effect on heat rates: the elasticity 
of heat rates to coal prices turns out to be about –0.05. This suggests we may underestimate the 
the effect of coal prices on utilization, but probably not by a large amount. Below, we further 
assess the potential bias by using different length time periods. 
6  Estimation Results 
This section first presents the estimated effects of coal prices on heat rates and utilization. 
We discuss the magnitude and robustness of the estimates, as well as interactions between New 
Source Review and coal prices. We then discuss the abatement costs of efficiency improvements 
that the estimates imply. The section concludes by reporting the estimated rebound effect. 
6.1  Effect of Coal Prices on Heat Rates 
6.1.1  Main Results 
Table 4 reports estimates of equation (3), where the dependent variable is the unit’s log 
heat rate over the five-year time period. Panel A does not include unit fixed effects, and Panel B 
includes unit fixed effects. The main coefficient of interest is  , which is the coefficient on the 
log price of coal and is interpreted as the elasticity of the heat rate to the price of coal.20 The 
regression includes a large number of other control variables for technical characteristics and 
utilization, as well as state and time period fixed effects. 
Column 1 shows the baseline specification. Without fixed effects, the estimate of   is -
0.053 with standard error 0.008, which is significant at the 1 percent level. The point estimate 
can be interpreted as an elasticity; a one standard deviation increase in coal prices reduces heat 
rate by about 1.7 percent. 
                                                 
20 The coal price variable reflects the cost of using coal. Therefore we add to the delivered coal price the associated 
sulfur dioxide emissions multiplied by the sulfur dioxide permit price for 1995-2009, adjusting for whether the unit 
is connected to a scrubber and whether the unit participated in the Acid Rain Program. Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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Adding unit fixed effects decreases the estimate to -0.016 with standard error 0.009, 
which is significant at the 10 percent level. A one standard deviation coal price increase causes a 
0.5 percent heat rate reduction.21 There are several possible explanations for the fact that adding 
unit fixed effects decreases the estimate by a substantial amount. First, the estimate with fixed 
effects could correspond to more of a short run estimate because it is estimated using within-unit 
variation; the estimate without fixed effects may reflect efficiency improvements that require 
major changes to capital equipment that are difficult to implement quickly but can be observed 
on a cross-sectional basis.22 Because our primary focus is on efficiency improvements at existing 
coal units, we would interpret the estimates in Panel A and Panel B as upper and lower bounds to 
the effect of coal prices on efficiency improvements. However, there are two other explanations 
for the discrepancy that suggest caution with making this interpretation: the specification that 
does not include unit fixed effects may not fully control for time-invariant unit characteristics; 
and including unit fixed effects may absorb much of the coal price variation, making it difficult 
to precisely estimate the coefficient. Note that the bias for the latter two cases could be in either 
direction. It is difficult to distinguish among these hypotheses, and in the remaining analysis we 
report estimates with and without fixed effects. 
We show that, overall, the results  are robust to other specifications and functional form 
assumptions. Equation (3) imposes a log-linear relationship between coal prices and heat rates. 
Although this functional form approximates a more complicated relationship, it is somewhat 
arbitrary. The results are similar using other functional forms, for example, estimating the 
equation using the heat rate and coal price in levels rather than in logs. Figure 5 provides further 
confirmation that the log-linear approximation is reasonable. Residuals are constructed from a 
regression of log heat rate and log coal price on the same independent variables as column 1 in 
Panel A, except that log coal price is not included as an independent variable. The figure plots 
                                                 
21 The calculation of the change in heat rate for a one standard deviation price increase uses the standard deviation 
of observed coal prices across the entire estimation sample. In Panel B,   is identified by within-unit coal price 
variation. Therefore, a more appropriate calculation may use the standard deviation of coal prices after removing 
unit-specific means. The standard deviation is smaller than for the full sample ($0.50/mmBtu instead of 
$0.62/mmBtu), and a one standard deviation increase corresponds to a 0.4 percent heat rate decrease. 
22 To investigate this interpretation further, we have restricted the sample to periods 1 and 5. The estimate of   
could be interpreted as more of a long run estimate than the estimate reported in Table 4 because it would reflect 
changes in coal prices and efficiency over a 25 year time horizon. The point estimate (without or with unit fixed 
effects) is very close to the estimate in Table 4 which suggests that the estimates reported in the table may reflect 
long run responses to coal prices.  Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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the residuals as well as the fitted values from a regression of the heat rate residuals on the coal 
price residuals (the slope of the fitted values equals  ). The figure does not indicate the presence 
of a nonlinear relationship between the heat rate and coal price residuals, which supports the 
linearity assumption in equation (3).  
Given the fixed costs and the importance of managerial quality in implementing heat rate 
improvements, heat rates at units owned by larger firms may be more responsive to coal prices 
than units owned by smaller firms. Columns 2 and 3 restrict the sample to the 10 largest and 20 
largest firms, based on firms’ total coal capacity in 2009.23 The estimates are not statistically 
significantly different from the baseline in Panel A (without fixed effects), but the results with 
fixed effects suggest that most of the response occurs at units owned by smaller firms. Thus, we 
do not find strong evidence that units owned by larger firms respond more to coal prices. 
6.1.2  Persistence 
Ideally, we would estimate the long-run effect of coal prices on heat rates because this 
relationship would provide insight into the effects of potentially permanent CO2 policies. 
Because the regressions include state and period fixed effects, we estimate   using deviations in 
coal prices from state averages and from the period averages. If such deviations were less than 
fully persistent, we would underestimate the long-run effect of coal prices on heat rates. We use 
several approaches to address this issue and find some evidence that the baseline estimates 
understate the long-run effect of coal prices on heat rates. 
We begin by estimating the persistence of coal prices. Panel A of Table 5 reports a series 
of regressions in which the log price of coal is the dependent variable and independent variables 
include the one-period lag coal price, state fixed effects, and period fixed effects. Column 1 uses 
the overall price of coal based on total contract and spot market purchases, column 2 uses the 
contract price, and column 3 uses the spot price. The estimates are all much less than one, which 
suggests that all prices exhibit some mean reversion. 
Panel B shows that the coefficients on lagged prices are much higher if the state fixed 
effects are removed. The same is not true if period fixed effects are removed (not reported), 
which suggests that if the estimates in Table 4 are less than long-run estimates, removing state 
fixed effects in the baseline regression would increase the estimated magnitude of  .  
                                                 
23 A firm refers to a parent company; for example, Southern Company is a single firm, which owns Alabama Power, 
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Column 1 in Table 6 repeats the specifications in column 1 of Table 4, except that the 
average coal price is separated into spot and contract prices. Given the relatively low persistence 
of these prices, we would expect these coefficients to be smaller in magnitude than the estimate 
for the overall price of coal. This pattern is observed, in fact, and the estimates on the spot and 
contract prices are small and are not statistically significant.  
The specifications in Panel B of Table 5 indicate that omitting state fixed effects from 
equation (3) should result in larger coefficients for the spot and contract prices, and to a lesser 
extent for the overall price. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 report the results of this exercise, which 
conform to expectations.24 
Another approach to assessing whether we estimate long-run responses is to use the coal 
price in the first year of each period rather than the average price in each period. Suppose firms 
take several years to implement heat rate improvements. If coal prices happen to change late in 
the five-year periods in our sample, we would underestimate the effect of coal prices on heat 
rates over a five-year period. To investigate this possibility, column 4 replaces the average coal 
price over the time period with the price in the first year. The results are similar to the baseline, 
as is the case if we estimate equation (3) using the price in the third year of each time period (not 
reported). We would expect to estimate a smaller coefficient using the price in the final year of 
each period rather than the average price, which is the case (not reported).25 
Finally, we attempt to incorporate persistence directly in equation (3). We estimate the 
same regression as column 1 of Table 5 separately for each region of the North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), and we define a persistence variable as the coefficient 
on the lagged coal price. Column 5 of Table 6 adds to the baseline the interaction of the 
persistence variable with the coal price. The interaction coefficient would be negative if more 
persistent coal price shocks had a larger effect on heat rates. The estimate is negative, but it is 
small and not statistically significant; in short, there is not sufficient variation in persistence to 
                                                 
24 Because of differences in the persistence of contract and spot prices, heat rates at units that use coal purchased 
under long term contracts may respond differently to coal prices than units that rely more on spot market purchases. 
In fact, the estimates are similar to the baseline if we restrict the sample to units that use coal mostly purchased 
under long term contracts, suggesting that this is not a significant concern. 
25 A related concern is that the five-year time periods are somewhat arbitrary. We obtain very similar results using 
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identify an effect. Taken together, Table 6 provides some evidence that we underestimate the 
effect of a permanent change in coal prices on heat rates. 
6.1.3  Coal Price Endogeneity 
As noted above, coal prices may be correlated with unobserved and time-varying 
generation unit attributes, such as managerial quality or negotiations over coal prices. Table 7 
reports specifications that address this possibility. Overall, we find that the results are robust. 
Unobserved unit characteristics are likely to be correlated with utilization. Column 1 
restricts the sample to units with high utilization, or more specifically, units with a median 
utilization rate above 0.5 across the five time periods. The estimate of   is similar to the 
baseline. 
Plant or generation unit entry and exit could be correlated with unobserved unit 
characteristics. Estimating equation (3) and omitting unit fixed effects would result in biased 
estimates in that case. Column 2 controls for entry and exit by restricting the sample to a 
balanced panel. The estimate of   is close to the baseline. 
Unobserved unit characteristics are likely to be correlated at the firm level. Some firms 
may be more efficient than others because of ownership structure, regulatory environment, or 
other factors. Column 3 includes parent company fixed effects, and the estimate of   is similar to 
the baseline. Column 4 allows for time-varying unobserved firm characteristics by including 
parent company-period fixed effects. The results are again similar to the baseline. Column 5 adds 
unit fixed effects to column 4, which results in a similar estimate to the baseline in Panel B of 
Table 4.  
The discussion has focused on unit, plant, or firm variables that vary over time and affect 
heat rates, but there may also be aggregate shocks that affect utilization in ways that we do not 
control for in equation (3). Column 6 includes several variables measured by state and year to 
proxy for such shocks: generation capacity, generation, gross state product, employment, and 
population. All variables are included in logs, and there are three separate variables for capacity 
and generation: total, coal, and natural gas. Because the capacity and generation variables are not 
available before 1990, the regressions do not include the first time period. Adding these variables 
to the baseline specification does not significantly affect the estimate. Column 7 adds unit fixed 
effects to column 6, however, which reduces the estimate compared with Panel B of Table 4. The 
results are not affected if we add natural gas prices to the baseline regression (not reported). Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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6.1.4  Regulatory and Market Incentives 
Regulatory and market incentives may affect the relationship between coal prices and 
heat rates. We have noted that some measures that might improve efficiency may be considered a 
major modification to the plant and thereby trigger a permitting process for NSR. This process 
may impose additional costs on plant owners and may provide a formidable barrier to making 
investments to improve heat rates. To examine the influence of NSR, we divide our data into two 
time periods. Before 1998 there was little concern about NSR enforcement proceedings, but that 
year EPA initiated information requests that signaled a potentially more aggressive stance. 
Keohane et al. (2007) note that by October of that year, the electricity trade press began reporting 
the possibility of EPA enforcement, and a year later, in November 1999, the Department of 
Justice initiated the first of a series of enforcement actions. We consider the first regime through 
1998 as one in which energy efficiency investments would be considered and implemented as 
part of routine maintenance and would not be expected to trigger an enforcement action. During 
the second regime (1999–2009) we assume that energy efficiency investments would be subject 
to scrutiny because they might increase utilization of a plant and its emissions, and hence would 
be likely to trigger NSR review.  
We use the two regimes to assess the interactions between NSR and heat rates. We expect 
heat rates to respond more to coal prices in the first regime when heat rate improvements would 
not have been expected to trigger NSR. We could estimate a separate   for the two regimes, 
expecting the estimate for the first regime to be larger in magnitude. Many other regulatory and 
market changes occurred between the first and second regimes, however, which could confound 
the analysis. Instead, we use annual data and estimate a separate   for each year of the sample; 
otherwise the specification is identical to the baseline in Table 4. Figure 6 plots the coefficient 
estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals. The figure provides only suggestive evidence for 
an NSR effect because it reveals a positive trend in   (heat rates becoming less sensitive to coal 
prices) over most of the sample period; in other words, factors other than NSR may have caused 
the upward trend. We have also tried estimating the same equation but rather than estimating a 
separate   for each year, we estimate a separate   for each regime and allow   to follow a 
separate linear trend in each regime. If we do not include unit fixed effects, we estimate a 
statistically significant and much larger   in the first regime, and the time trends are small and 
not significant in both regimes. This provides some further evidence that NSR reduces the Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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responsiveness of heat rates to coal prices, but without better data we cannot reach a stronger 
conclusion.26 
Section 3 suggested that privately owned firms might respond more to economic 
incentives. We examine the influence of ownership structure with a dummy variable interacted 
with log coal price. The sign of the interaction coefficient is consistent with the hypothesis that 
privately owned firms are more responsive, separately considering investor-owned utilities and 
nonutility generators, but it is small and significant at only about the 10 percent level (not 
reported). Similarly, we do not observe large differences across federal, state, municipal, and co-
op ownership types. 
Beginning with the 1992 Energy Policy Act, competition began to affect the industry in a 
stronger way and different types of private ownership emerged. These changes suggest that 
privately owned units, and in particular nonregulated privately owned units, would respond more 
to coal prices after around 1995. For example, Fabrizio et al. (2007) find that the transition to 
market-oriented environments in this period had led to the greatest efficiency gains at investor-
owned plants in states that restructured their electricity markets. Our results are not affected if we 
control for the effect of restructuring on average heat rates by adding to the baseline specification 
the interaction of a set of state dummies with a post-1995 dummy. We have estimated several 
specifications that allow for different responses to coal prices across ownership types and 
generally do not find significant differences, either for units in the same period that have a 
different ownership type or for units with a particular ownership type across periods. The pre- 
and post-1995 distinction is somewhat crude, however, and the interaction between regulatory 
environment and coal prices is a topic for future research. 
6.2  Effect of a Carbon Tax on Heat Rates 
The estimation results can be used to estimate abatement costs at existing coal units from 
improving heat rates. We use the baseline estimates in Table 4 to calculate the percentage 
reduction in heat rate from a $10 per ton of CO2 tax on coal (i.e., assuming the tax is fully passed 
through to delivered coal prices and holding fixed utilization). We estimate heat rate reductions 
of 1 to 3 percent, where the lower estimate derives from the specification with fixed effects and 
                                                 
26 Whether adding pollution abatement controls triggers NSR also varies over time. This suggests examining 
changes in heat rates after pollution equipment is added, but unfortunately, there are not enough units that add 
equipment in the different regimes to test this hypothesis. Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
24 
the upper estimate from the specification without fixed effects. As the previous analysis showed, 
this range is quite robust to a variety of alternative specifications. The range overlaps 
engineering estimates, although the upper end of the range is higher than the engineering 
estimates. For many of the robustness checks, the effect of the coal price on heat rates was even 
larger than in the baseline specification, which suggests that the baseline estimate may, if 
anything, be biased toward zero. 
6.3  Effect of Coal Prices on Utilization 
We use equation (4) to estimate the effect of coal prices on utilization. The dependent 
variable is the log utilization rate by unit and year, and the independent variables are the same as 
in equation (3) except that the utilization controls are omitted.  
Tables 8 and 9 report the estimation results. Columns 1–3 repeat the specifications from 
Table 4. The coefficient on the log price of coal is interpreted as the elasticity of the utilization 
rate to the coal price. Across specifications, the estimated elasticity is typically around –0.4, 
which suggests that a 10 percent price increase would cause a 4 percent reduction in the 
utilization rate (from a mean utilization rate of 0.61 across all years in the sample).  
The remaining columns in Table 8 and all of Table 9 document the robustness of these 
results. Two specifications in Table 8 are particularly noteworthy. First, if a coal price increase 
causes firms to reduce heat rates, we would expect the effect of an increase in coal price on 
utilization to decrease over longer time horizons as firms make investments to reduce their heat 
rates. Column 4 of Table 8 reports results that are consistent with this hypothesis; the estimated 
elasticities are only somewhat smaller using five-year intervals instead of annual observations. 
This suggests that the bias from failing to control for heat rates in equation (4) may not be large. 
Second, the effect of coal prices on utilization depends on other factor prices, particularly 
natural gas prices. If natural gas prices are high relative to coal, a coal price increase may have a 
small effect on coal unit utilization because the increase would not affect the competitiveness of 
coal units compared with gas units. In fact, we do observe a smaller effect of coal prices on coal 
unit utilization when natural gas prices are high. For example, column 5 of Table 8 uses 
observations from the years 2001–2009, when natural gas prices were higher than in the previous 
decade, and the reported elasticities are much smaller than in column 1, which uses the entire 
sample. The results suggest that the price of natural gas relative to the price of coal affects 
utilization, which is confirmed in other unreported specifications (e.g., replacing the coal price in Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
25 
equation (5) with the ratio of the coal to natural gas price); other factors could explain the results, 
of course, and we treat the results with some caution.  
Table 9 reports a statistically significant effect of coal prices on utilization across 
specifications that parallel the heat rate specifications in Table 7. Overall, we estimate an 
elasticity of utilization to coal prices of about –0.2 to –0.4. Because of our interest in estimating 
the cost-effectiveness of future policies, we prefer the estimates from the most recent time period 
(i.e., the specification in column 5 of Table 8, which uses observations from 2001–2009).  
7  The Cost-Effectiveness of Policy Alternatives 
We use a simple model of the power sector to illustrate the policy implications of the 
empirical estimates. One paper (Burtraw et al. 2011b) has previously represented endogenous 
efficiency improvements at existing coal plants within a simulation model using engineering 
estimates of investment opportunities and costs. This section conducts similar analysis 
incorporating the econometric estimates into a simple model of the electricity sector to compare 
the cost-effectiveness of four policies for reducing CO2 emissions from existing coal units. We 
consider two forms of a technology standard, a traditional heat rate standard and a flexible 
standard, plus a Btu tax on coal and an emissions tax on fossil fuel. We briefly summarize these 
policy alternatives, then we summarize the model and report the results; Appendix 3 contains 
details of the model. 
7.1  Policies 
We characterize a traditional heat rate standard as imposing a maximum heat rate ceiling 
(mmBtu/MWh) requiring all facilities to achieve that standard or to retire. (The heat rate 
standard has a close analogue in an emissions rate standard in tons of CO2/MWh.) Another 
approach might impose a requirement for a percentage improvement in heat rate in all or some 
portion of the fleet, or impose a different rate for different types of generators (e.g., based on 
firing type). Facing a traditional standard, a facility operator evaluates the net profit of the 
necessary improvements to enable continued operation, and   serves as a measure of the 
opportunity cost of those improvements. Improving heat rates would reduce fuel costs and 
increase utilization, as captured by  . 
A flexible heat rate performance standard sets a benchmark (e.g., a uniform standard or 
one that varies by generator type) and allows firms that overcomply with the benchmark to 
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relatively greater investments and transfer efficiency credits to other facilities. Flexibility allows 
for equalization of the marginal opportunity costs of efficiency improvements, and greater total 
emissions reductions can be achieved for the same aggregate cost as under a traditional standard.  
Introducing a market-determined opportunity cost for generation units is one feature a 
flexible performance standard has in common with a Btu tax on coal or an emissions price that 
might be introduced through either an emissions cap or a tax. However, a flexible performance 
standard is different from cap-and-trade in two important ways. First, a standard does not cap 
emissions. Overall emissions are able to grow with increased production, even as that production 
becomes more efficient. Second and following from the first, with the flexible performance 
standard the regulator does not explicitly allocate credits. Instead, the regulator sets a benchmark 
emissions rate for each unit. Credits are earned for electricity production at the benchmark rate; 
that is, the regulator implicitly allocates credits through the assignment of benchmark rates. 
Facilities surrender credits at their actual emissions rates. Facilities with emissions rates below 
the benchmark earn surplus credits with each unit of generation, while facilities with rates above 
the benchmark earn a deficit that would be filled with transfers from other facilities. Hence, the 
flexible performance standard can be understood to encompass two instruments in one policy: it 
imposes an opportunity cost on heat rate, providing an incentive for heat rate improvements, and 
it provides an output subsidy equivalent to the value of credits earned for each unit of electricity 
generation.27 Thus, the flexible standard introduces a sort of rebound effect, in which units that 
overcomply have an incentive to increase output. 
The consequence is that a flexible performance standard is likely to result in greater 
utilization of the regulated facilities than under a Btu tax, emissions cap-and-trade, or an 
emissions tax, and conceivably greater utilization than in the absence of regulation. Under a Btu 
tax or an emissions price, one way to reduce emissions is to reduce utilization, but this would not 
necessarily lead to a reduction in the heat rate, which is the target of a standard. Similarly, a 
reduction in utilization would not contribute to meeting a traditional (inflexible) performance 
standard. Further, the output subsidy implicit in the flexible performance standard provides an 
incentive to increase utilization and should lead to greater total utilization of the regulated 
facilities.  
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We measure the rebound effect as the change in system level emissions due to the change 
in utilization that arises from heat rate improvements at the generating units. To estimate the 
change in emissions in the absence of the rebound effect we evaluate the new equilibrium with 
utilization determined by the baseline heat rates. See Appendix 4 for details. 
7.2  Model 
Our static model of the electricity market contains a representation of all coal-fired power 
plants in operation in 2009 organized into 22 regions. Each firm in the market owns a single unit, 
as indexed by   in equation (1), and sells electricity into a competitive wholesale market. There is 
perfect substitutability among facilities within a region but no transmission between regions. 
Each region has a backstop natural gas combined-cycle power plant that provides residual 
generation necessary to meet a fixed level of demand. The operating costs of the natural gas 
plants vary by region, based on empirical information about variable operations and maintenance 
costs, and the delivered cost of natural gas determines the price of wholesale power in the region 
and the revenue to coal plants. Hence, gas units do not earn profits. Profits for coal plants come 
from the difference between the wholesale power price and the sum of operating costs and fuel 
costs.  
The analysis focuses on the optimal choice of heat rate conditional on the capacity and 
exogenous variables. In equation (1) the cost of choosing heat rate is  () ii c h K   and thus the heat 
rate cost scales linearly with the unit’s capacity. The marginal cost of generating electricity 
includes fuel costs, which equal the average price of coal in each region multiplied by the heat 
rate (   ), plus average regional nonfuel operations and maintenance costs,  . To simplify the 
expressions, we normalize the CO2 emissions rate to equal 0.1 ton of CO2 per mmBtu of heat 
input, thereby making a heat rate standard equivalent to an emissions rate standard. We adopt 
constant elasticity of substitution functional forms for the cost of choosing heat rate and 
utilization, and set the elasticity parameters,           and         , based on the regression 
of heat rate and utilization on coal prices. We solve for the constant   , describing each unit’s 
type, based on its observed utilization rate. The profit function is modified appropriately for each 
policy, and we solve the model to estimate changes in heat rates, emissions, and profits (see 
Appendix 3). 
7.3  Policy Effects on Efficiency Investments and Fuel Switching 
The traditional standard is calibrated to achieve a 1 percent reduction in heat rate, and the 
other policies are calibrated to achieve the same emissions reductions. Under the traditional Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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standard, each unit must achieve a heat rate of 10.78 mmBtu/MWh or reduce its heat rate by 10 
percent, whichever results in a higher heat rate. By setting the average heat rate reduction to 1 
percent and imposing a cap on heat rate reductions of 10 percent, the changes in heat rates that 
occur in the simulations are of similar magnitude to the changes observed in the data. In the 
baseline 22 percent of units have heat rates above this standard. Achieving the standard results in 
a 0.88 percent reduction in emissions across coal and gas units, illustrating that the rebound 
effect erodes 13 percent of the emissions reduction associated with efficiency improvements. 
Coal generation increases of 0.19 percent are concentrated entirely at facilities that have initial 
heat rates above the standard. These results are presented in Table 10.  
To achieve a 0.88 percent reduction in emissions under the flexible standard requires an 
emissions rate benchmark of 10.26 mmBtu/MWh, and a price for a tradable performance 
standard credit of $0.42/mmBtu. The rebound effect due to the increase in utilization erodes 15.3 
percent of emissions reductions that would otherwise result from the heat rate improvement, 
illustrating the important role of the output subsidy under a tradable performance standard. Heat 
rate improvements occur across the distribution of coal plants.  
Under the taxes, the emissions reductions are achieved with an emissions tax of $1.126 
per metric ton CO2 and a coal Btu tax of $0.115 per mmBtu. As expected, the coal tax requires a 
higher tax rate (after converting to a common metric) than the more broadly based emissions tax. 
Under the taxes, the rebound effect is much smaller, about 2 percent in each case. However, it is 
noteworthy that the rebound is slightly greater under the emissions tax because it applies to 
natural gas as well as coal. Hence, the change in relative prices is less under the emissions tax 
than under the coal Btu tax. 
Although calibrated to achieve comparable emissions reductions as the inflexible 
standard, the flexible standard also yields a nearly identical decline in heat rates. In contrast, the 
emissions tax yields a reduction in heat rates of 0.18 percent, and the carbon Btu tax yields a 
reduction of 0.16 percent. The standards lead to an order of magnitude greater annual investment 
in heat rate improvements than the taxes, with the inflexible standard resulting in about twice the 
investment of the flexible standard.28 Consequently the standards result in an increase in coal 
generation whereas the taxes lead to an increase in natural gas generation. In sum, we find these 
policies are relatively most effective with respect to their specific targets. The relatively narrowly 
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focused performance standards lead to greater improvements in energy efficiency and less fuel 
switching. The price-based policies are effective across all eligible channels to achieve 
comparable emissions reductions.29  
We have conducted sensitivity analysis using a larger utilization elasticity (         
instead of -0.2) and for more stringent policies (using heat rate improvements of 2 or 3 percent as 
the benchmark instead of 1 percent). For the higher elasticity, to achieve a given emissions 
reduction with the standards there is more investment (compared to the low elasticity simulation) 
because of the larger rebound effect. The measures reported in Table 10 change roughly linearly 
with the stringency of the policies, although the rebound effect for the standards grows only 
modestly. Across the alternative simulations, the conclusions are qualitatively similar to those 
from the simulation reported in Table 10 (results are available upon request). 
8  Conclusions 
Currently, the Clean Air Act is the most important federal policy for addressing climate 
change. EPA is preparing to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from existing stationary sources, 
the most important of which are coal-fired electricity steam boilers. Engineering case studies 
have identified possible reductions in emissions through efficiency improvements at zero or 
moderate cost that could amount to 1.6 percent of total U.S. emissions in 2009. However, a 
substantial literature raises doubts that widespread and unrealized cost-effective efficiency 
opportunities exist. Heretofore, empirical information was lacking about the actual magnitude 
and cost of these potential efficiency improvements across the fleet of existing generating units. 
This information should be central to rulemakings under the CAA, which in this case will rely on 
technical estimates of potential opportunities as well as costs for the determination of a standard 
for these facilities. Furthermore, this information should be important to the characterization of 
other policy alternatives, such as legislative proposals for cap-and-trade or emissions taxes. For 
example, federal agency analysis of proposed cap-and-trade legislation (HR 2454) that passed 
the House of Representatives in 2009 had no information about potential efficiency 
                                                 
29 Welfare comparisons across the policies are not strictly valid because we assume natural gas supply is perfectly 
elastic and consumer demand is perfectly inelastic. Electricity prices and consumer surplus are affected only under 
the emissions tax which is applied to natural gas as well as coal emissions. Within this framework, the inflexible 
standard is about three times more costly than the taxes. Firms optimize against the taxes and abate in ways that is 
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improvements at existing coal boilers, and consequently it may have overestimated the 
abatement cost for the economy as a whole (EIA 2009). Moreover, engineering estimates of 
potential improvements in other existing stationary sources suggest potential emissions 
reductions that add up to more than 6 percent of U.S. emissions, without accounting for fuel 
switching (Burtraw et al. 2011a). Analysis similar to the one in this paper could possibly verify 
or refute those potential opportunities. 
We compile a unique data set covering about 97 percent of U.S. coal-fired units over 25 
years of operation and use the data to estimate the opportunities to reduce emissions rates by 
improving the efficiency of these plants. We note that the introduction of a performance standard 
will impose opportunity costs similar to costs associated with fuel use; hence, the effective price 
of fuel will change in response to the regulation.  
We find strong evidence that heat rates (a measure of efficiency and a proxy for 
emissions) respond to changes in fuel prices. For example, a change in coal prices commensurate 
with a $10 tax on CO2 emissions would stimulate a 1 to 3 percent reduction in heat rates and 
emissions rates. This range of costs encompasses the estimates suggested in the engineering 
literature; indeed it includes the possibility of somewhat lower costs than have been suggested.  
An important consideration in whether these efficiency improvements lead to emissions 
reductions is the degree to which generating units respond to improvements in heat rates by 
increasing their utilization. If they do, one would observe a rebound in emissions that would 
erode some of the emissions reductions that would otherwise occur. In fact, we find a significant 
effect of coal prices on utilization. A 10 percent coal price increase would decrease utilization 2-
4 percent (holding fixed heat rates). 
We evaluate these econometric estimates in a simulation model with inelastic demand 
and infinitely elastic fuel supply. Natural gas generation is used to meet residual demand, and we 
solve for changes in heat rate and utilization at coal facilities under a variety of policy scenarios. 
We find that a performance standard leads to substantially greater investment in efficiency 
improvements than taxes (or other policies that set an emissions price, such as cap-and-trade), 
which allow for broader compliance options, including fuel switching. This outcome is 
consistent with the theory that broad-based, incentive-based policies should be more efficient 
than performance standards, even after accounting for the opportunity for efficiency 
improvements. We also find the rebound effect to be 11 to 13 percent, which reduces the 
emissions savings by roughly the same percentage. The rebound effect under the taxes is an 
order of magnitude less than under the performance standards. Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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We have noted a few possible directions for future work. Because the econometric model 
is static, we do not allow for plant retirements in the simulations. Introducing dynamics would 
enable an evaluation of more aggressive performance standards than those considered here.  
We have provided some suggestive evidence that the economic and regulatory 
environments affect the relationship between fuel prices and heat rates. Future work could 
investigate further the effect of competition, NSR, and other policies on the adoption of energy 
efficiency technology. 
In conclusion, substantial long-term reductions in GHG emissions from the power sector 
will require greater use of nonemitting sources (renewables, nuclear), lower-emitting sources 
(natural gas), or postcombustion control of carbon. However, we find evidence that there exist 
opportunities to reduce emissions at existing facilities at low cost in the short run. These 
reductions could contribute importantly to meeting international commitments as articulated in 
the Copenhagen Accord. 
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Appendix 1: Determinants of Heat Rates 
This section provides a more detailed review of the literature on heat rates than is found 
in the main text. 
Cogeneration 
Cogenerators, or combined heat and power generators, are facilities that recycle heat to 
produce both electricity and useful thermal energy. The additional energy captured is typically 
used for manufacturing processes or central heating. Cogeneration is regarded as a highly 
efficient technology for many applications, yet traditional heat rate calculations are misleading 
because heat input per unit of generation does not account for the useful thermal output. 
Furthermore, the manager of a cogeneration facility can adjust the proportion of heat versus 
electricity based on the customers’ needs, heating fuel and electricity prices, and regulation.  
Utilization 
As noted, more efficient plants typically are used more heavily. Moreover, higher 
utilization tends to reduce heat rates. Conversely, less efficient plants are available to be ramped 
up and down more frequently, which requires additional fuel input because the temperature in 
the boiler fluctuates, and which further amplifies their relatively high heat rates.  
Pollution Controls 
Because fossil fuel–fired electric power plants emit a variety of pollutants, they are 
subject to numerous environmental regulations at the local, state, and federal levels. Regulations 
exist for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, mercury, and acid gases. Reducing 
emissions to comply with these regulations can affect efficiency. Fleishman et al. (2009) found 
that implementing pollution controls may ―crowd out‖ investment in productivity improvements 
if firms face capital constraints. On the other hand, several papers have studied the trade-offs 
between pollution controls and productivity of a plant in the power sector as well as other 
manufacturing industries that face similar environmental regulations. These studies conclude that 
inputs and pollution can be reduced without sacrificing productivity (Boyd and McClelland 
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Fuel Choice 
Coal-fired power plants generally use one or a combination of three types of coal: 
bituminous, subbituminous, and lignite. The choice depends on relative prices and 
characteristics. Coal types vary in heat, ash, and sulfur per pound and are priced accordingly; 
higher heat content justifies a higher price. Because of regulations on emissions of sulfur 
dioxide, low-sulfur coal is also priced higher. Efficiency may also increase with low-sulfur coal 
as it negates the need for energy-intensive postcombustion pollution control (scrubbers). 
Transportation costs also have a large effect on delivered coal prices. Because certain coal types 
are more common to specific regions of the country, location may influence a plant’s choice of 
fuel. 
Regulation and Incentives 
Regulation may also affect efficiency. Coal-fired power plants have demonstrated useful 
lives that are much longer than many anticipated when they were originally constructed. 
Ellerman (1998) notes that these life extensions are due to new electronics in the boilers and 
other features that improve plant efficiency and longevity. However, some measures that might 
improve efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions may be considered a major modification to the 
plant and thereby trigger New Source Review (NSR) for other pollutants under the Clean Air 
Act. Permitting under NSR requires a site-specific and technology-based review of the control 
technology proposed by the source and a demonstration that the plant will not create or 
exacerbate violations of air quality standards in the surrounding area (Richardson et al. 2011). 
Consequently, NSR can raise the cost of efficiency improvements by requiring the installation of 
pollution abatement equipment.  
At least three papers have studied the effect of NSR on plant operations. Bushnell and 
Wolfram (2010) and Stavins (2006) found that NSR causes older plants—and therefore 
potentially less efficient plants—to operate more. Also, anecdotal evidence suggests that plant 
owners have deferred cost-effective improvements that might initiate a permitting process 
(Keohane et al. 2007). 
Other regulatory practices may insulate plant operators from the cost of continuing the 
inefficient operation of existing plants. For example, state-level fuel cost adjustment clauses 
allow firms to pass fuel costs through to retail electricity ratepayers (DOE/NETL 2010). These 
provisions are common in regions of the country that operate under cost-of-service regulation, 
including regulated investor-owned utilities and publicly owned utilities. Such provisions are 
intended to remove from shareholders the risk from fluctuations in fuel prices. Depending on Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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how they are structured, fuel cost pass-through provisions could reduce the incentive to make 
efficiency improvements if cost savings would be offset by lower retail prices. 
Knittel (2002) examined various efficiency incentive programs run by electric utilities. 
Programs for generator efficiency modifications improve efficiency more than other types of 
programs. Automatic fuel cost pass-through, in which an increase in fuel cost passes directly to 
the consumer without a rate hearing, reduces plant efficiency.  
Since 1978, the electricity sector has been restructured gradually so that electricity 
generators increasingly operate in competitive environments. Many studies have focused on the 
effects of electricity restructuring in the United States. Much of the literature has examined the 
effect of restructuring on electricity prices, market performance, or market power (Joskow 1997; 
Borenstein et al. 2002; Bushnell et al. 2008), but several have considered the relationship 
between regulation and technical efficiency. Joskow (1974) and Hendricks (1975) showed that 
regulatory structures can provide significant incentives for public utilities to reduce costs. As 
noted previously, Fabrizio et al. (2007) found that restructuring reduces employment and fuel 
consumption at firms throughout the affected wholesale power markets, including those that 
were not restructured. 
Ownership 
The firm’s ownership structure may affect efficiency improvements. Ownership types 
include private utilities (investor owned or privately owned), public utilities (municipal, state, or 
federal), and cooperatives. Because of different objective functions, degrees of principal-agent 
conflicts, and exposure to market forces or other factors, different ownership types may not place 
the same emphasis on improving efficiency (all else equal).  
Ownership structure is also closely related to the regulatory environment. Following 
deregulation in many states, privately owned utilities were required or encouraged to divest 
generation assets and act solely as transmitters and distributers of electricity. Publicly owned 
utilities were largely unaffected by this trend. States that remained under regulation tended to 
remain dominated by vertically integrated utilities, although nonutilities may still participate in 
the wholesale market. Bushnell and Wolfram (2005) report greater efficiency at units that were 
divested from utility to nonutility; however, similar improvements were observed at nondivested 
units that were subject to other efficiency incentives. Thus, restructuring or changing regulatory 
incentives can encourage efficiency investments. On the other hand, Fischlein et al. (2009) find 
large differences in the efficiency of investor-owned utilities as opposed to municipalities, rural Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
38 
cooperatives, or district power providers. A possible explanation is that publicly owned 
companies might be insulated from market-driven incentives to improve efficiency, but this is 
widely disputed, and publicly owned companies have broader performance criteria than do 
privately owned firms that may affect efficiency measures. 
Appendix 2: Data 
Data Sources  
The main data source, which defines our universe of units, is the Energy Information 
Administration’s form 767 (EIA-767) and successor forms. This government-mandated survey 
collects boiler- and generator-level information from fossil fuel–fired electric power plants with 
nameplate capacity greater than 10 megawatts (MW). All units that fire any coal during each 
year were included in the panel data set.  
The EIA-767 provides most of the variables of interest, including monthly heat input, 
monthly generation, boiler vintage, boiler technology, nameplate capacity, location, and fuel 
type. Other data sources provide additional variables or fill in missing observations. EIA forms 
860 and 861 provided information on ownership and generator characteristics. EPA’s National 
Electric Energy Data System (NEEDS) includes variables for the existence and vintage of 
environmental controls at individual units.  
Issues with the Data 
Coverage 
The panel data set covers the years 1985 through 2009. However, the sample does not 
include the years 2006 and 2007 because EIA discontinued form 767 after 2005 and did not 
collect unit-specific data on the successor forms until 2008.  
Another issue that affects coverage is the change in reporting requirements for EIA-767 
over time. Prior to 2001, only regulated plants with nameplate capacity greater than 10 MW were 
required to report. Between 2001 and 2003, the survey expanded to include unregulated plants, 
but they reported generation only if nameplate capacity exceeded 100 MW. After 2003, all plants 
greater than 10 MW—both regulated and unregulated—reported all variables.  
Heat Rate Adjustments 
Because the annual heat rates are calculated using sums of monthly data, measured 
annual heat rates can be highly influenced by missing data or unreasonably high or low heat rates Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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in a single month. These ―outlier‖ heat rates are not possible according to engineering estimates 
and usually arise because of a problem in the data, such as negative generation, missing heat 
input or generation, or reporting error.
30 Often, these outlier monthly heat rates contributed to a 
misleading figure for the annual heat rate. 
To address this issue and avoid dropping full years of data, we adjust the annual heat 
rates by dropping months that contain negative generation, missing data, or outlier heat rates. We 
define an outlier monthly heat rate as being more than two standard deviations above or below 
the monthly mean across all years for the unit. This ensures that only heat rates outside normal 
engineering limits were dropped. The annual heat rates are calculated using the remaining 
months. 
Boiler-to-Generator Correspondence 
The last constraint on the data stems from the boiler-to-generator correspondence at 
individual plants. Heat input is measured at the boiler level, whereas generation is measured at 
the generator level. In most cases, a single boiler is connected to a single generator, and 
calculating heat rate is straightforward. When many boilers connect to a single generator, we 
aggregate heat input across boilers. Other characteristics of that group of boilers are aggregated 
or averaged. Similarly, when many generators are linked with a single boiler, we aggregate 
generation to a single generator. This technique allows us to calculate heat rates for the units in 
our sample that do not have a one-to-one boiler-to-generator correspondence. However, the 
trade-off is that for some units, the vintage, size, technology, and fuel represent an average or 
dominant characteristic of the group rather than an actual unit. In general, the configurations with 
multiple boilers or generators account for less than 4 percent of the observations.
31 Omitting 
these units in the estimation does not affect the results. 
Appendix 3: Simulation Model 
We use a model of coal unit operation to simulate the effects on profits and emissions of 
four policies: a traditional emissions rate standard, a flexible emissions rate standard, a coal 
                                                 
30 Negative generation occurs when the plant generates electricity for use at the plant but does not supply any 
electricity to end users. 
31 The higher percentage in 2004 results from the different reporting requirements across years. Prior to 2004, 
smaller or unregulated units did not report generation and these units are less likely to have a one-to-one 
correspondence. Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
40 
emissions tax (or equivalently a cap-and-trade program that introduces a comparable price on 
CO2), and a fossil fuel emissions tax. The effects on profits and emissions depend on how the 
policies affect generator utilization and heat rates; we first illustrate these effects using the 
model’s first-order conditions. Then, the model is calibrated using the empirical estimates from 
Section 6 and using the coal prices and heat rates observed in our sample in 2009. 
Profit Maximization in the Absence of CO2 Regulation 
We begin with a static model of the electricity market that contains a large number of 
coal electricity generation units, each of which maximizes profits, taking prices as given. We 
first consider the case in which there is no CO2 regulation. Each firm in the market owns a unit, 
which we index by  . The firm sells electricity into a competitive wholesale market in which 
there is a backstop natural gas generator that supplies electricity at a constant marginal cost. Let 
   equal the price of electricity in region   in dollars per MWh and 
f
r p  equal the delivered price 
of coal in dollars per mmBtu. The firm has already chosen the capacity of the unit,   , and the 
analysis focuses on the optimal choice of heat rate conditional on the capacity and exogenous 
variables.  
The cost of choosing heat rate    is        , where        and        . Thus, the heat rate 
cost scales linearly with the unit’s capacity. 
The marginal cost of generating electricity includes fuel costs, which equal the price of 
coal multiplied by the heat rate  
f
ri ph , plus nonfuel operations and maintenance costs,   , 
which is the capacity-weighted average for coal units in the region.  
The unit’s generation output is equal to its capacity multiplied by the capacity utilization 
rate,  . The utilization rate is a function of fuel costs and unit type:    ,
f
i r i i u u p h     where    is 
a unit-specific constant. For simplicity we ignore operations and maintenance costs in the 
utilization decision. Utilization is decreasing in fuel costs because a unit with higher marginal 
costs is less competitive with other generation units in the market. Thus, a unit with a higher heat 
rate produces less electricity. The constant    is proportional to the quality of the unit, and it may 
reflect unit-specific characteristics such as managerial quality or its idiosyncratic economic 
value, given its location in the transmission system. Units with a higher value of    produce more 
electricity. 
The firm maximizes profits by choosing the heat rate. The profit maximization problem is 
      ,) x ( ma
i
ff
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The first-order condition for the heat rate is 
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   (A6) 
If utilization is relatively insensitive to heat rate and coal prices (consistent with the empirical 
evidence), an increase in the price of coal reduces heat rates. The net effect of the coal price 
increase on utilization is ambiguous, depending on whether the decrease in heat rate more than 
offsets the increase in the coal price.  
Traditional Heat Rate Standard 
Suppose the government mandates a heat rate ceiling such that all units have to achieve 
this standard through efficiency investments. In our model, units will respond in one of two 
ways. Units with an initial heat rate at or below the standard ( ˆ
ii hh  ) will make no change (note 
that the standard could be unit-specific). Units with an initial heat rate above the standard ( ˆ
ii hh 
) will make investments to lower their heat rates to equal the standard. Units with an initial heat 
rate above the standard that choose to make an investment incur a cost of reaching the standard: 
    ˆ
ii c h c h  . These units are expected to increase utilization to capitalize on their lower heat 
rates:    ˆ,
f
r i i u p h  .  
To simplify the expressions, we normalize the CO2 emissions rate to equal 0.1 ton of CO2 
per mmBtu of heat input. Because the emissions rate is normalized to 0.1, the heat rate standard 
is synonymous with an emissions rate standard. The endogenous decisions of each unit under the 
traditional standard will determine the aggregate change in emissions. The total change in 
emissions is held constant for comparison with the other policies. 
Flexible Heat Rate Standard 
Instead of imposing a traditional heat rate standard, suppose the government sets a heat 
rate standard of   ̅. If the unit exceeds the standard, it generates credits equal to the difference 
between its heat rate and the standard, multiplied by the electricity it generates. The profit 
maximization problem is 
          max , [ , ] ( )
i
f f f
rr r r i i i i i i r i i i i i i h p m p h u p h P h h K P h h Ku p h P h h c h K             (A7) 
where the price of the credits is  , which is exogenous to the firm. The first-order condition is Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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
(A8) 
To achieve a comparable level of emissions when comparing policies, we use the 
emissions change under the flexible heat rate standard as the emissions target to be achieved by 
endogenously solving for the value of regulatory instruments with the other policies.  
Coal Btu Tax 
Suppose instead the government imposes a tax on coal heat input, or equivalently a tax on 
coal Btu. This results in the following profit maximization problem: 
      max ( ) , ( )
i
ff
r r r i i i r i i i i h
p m p u p h h h Kc h K           (A9) 
The first-order condition for the heat rate is 
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  (A10) 
A comparison of equations (A6) in the absence of carbon policy and (A10) shows that the 
Btu tax affects the firm’s heat rate and utilization the same as an increase in the price of coal. 
Consequently, imposing the Btu tax reduces heat rates and has an ambiguous effect on 
utilization. Comparing equation (A10) with equation (A8) for the flexible heat rate standard, we 
observe that the Btu tax reduces utilization (i.e., holding the heat rate constant), whereas the 
emissions rate standard increases or decreases utilization, depending on whether the heat rate is 
lower than or greater than the standard. This comparison demonstrates the importance of the 
rebound effect. 
CO2 Emissions Tax 
An emissions tax on all fossil fuel is modeled similarly to the Btu tax on coal because the 
CO2 emissions rate is normalized to equal 0.1 ton of CO2 per mmBtu of heat input. However, the 
emissions tax is applied to the backstop natural gas technology as well as to coal generation, and 
consequently it increases the wholesale price of electricity as well as the coal price.  
Calibrating the Model 
We can use equations (A6), (A8), and (A10) to assess the effect of each policy on heat 
rates and utilization. To do so, we must choose functional forms for the heat rate cost function Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
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     and for the utilization function  ( , )
f
r i u p h  . We assume that both functions can be 
characterized by a constant elasticity of substitution: 












  (A11) 
    , ( )
ff
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     (A12) 
where         and      . The parameters   and   are estimated from the regression of heat 
rate and utilization on coal prices. The constant    is recovered from the unit’s observed 
utilization rate, and    is calculated from the first-order condition in the unregulated case. We 
make two remarks about the functional form assumption of the utilization and heat rate cost 
functions. First, the assumptions are consistent with the estimating equations in Section 5. The 
second observation is that the unobserved quality    enters multiplicatively. 
The cost of each policy to regulated units depends on (1) the cost of changing heat rates 
and (2) the change in operating profits (i.e., the difference between the electricity price and 
marginal costs multiplied by generation). In other words, we estimate the short-run costs of the 
policies, in the absence of entry, exit, or changes in capacity.  
The effectiveness of each policy is equal to the change in electricity sector CO2 
emissions. Therefore, we need to characterize the effect of each policy on the rest of the sector. 
We make the simplifying assumptions that the policies do not affect total electricity generation in 
the system, and that any changes in total coal generation are offset by natural gas generation. The 
natural gas emissions rate is assumed to be 0.05 tons of CO2 per mmBtu. The electricity price 
varies by region and is determined by the marginal cost of a natural gas combined-cycle unit; 
hence, the analysis does not include the profits of natural gas generators. Their marginal cost 
depends on the average heat rate, delivered price of natural gas, and operations and maintenance 
costs for combined-cycle units in the region. The national average marginal cost is $38/MWh.  
We use the first-order conditions above to solve for the heat rate of each unit under each 
policy. We then use the utilization function to estimate generation for each unit. Finally, we 
calculate the change in total coal operating profits and emissions by summing across coal-fired 
generation units and calculating the change in natural gas generation. 
   Resources for the Future  Linn, Mastrangelo, and Burtraw 
44 
Appendix 4: Measuring the Rebound Effect 
We characterize the rebound effect as the change in emissions due to the change in 
utilization in response solely to changes in heat rate improvements at the generating units. 
Performance standards or taxes change the relative marginal generation costs of units. The 
standards lead directly to heat rate improvements and the taxes change the relative effective fuel 
prices between coal and natural gas, which in turn lead to heat rate improvements. To estimate 
the change in emissions in the absence of the rebound effect, we evaluate the new equilibrium 
with utilization determined by the baseline heat rates. Against this estimate, we measure the 
rebound effect as the further change that occurs when utilization is based on the improved heat 
rates.  
To simplify notation, let    , 0,1 jk  denote the baseline indicated by zero and the new 
equilibrium indicated by 1. We suppress notation for the individual unit type and describe 
utilization as a function of only the price of fuel and the heat rate:   
f
jk j k u u p h  . We describe 
emissions from coal-fired units as a function of utilization and the heat rate:    , c jk k e u h . For 
example, we represent emissions at the new effective fuel prices and heat rates but based on 
utilization that would occur at the new prices and the old heat rate as    10 1 , c e u h . Utilization of 
natural gas units adjusts to the change in utilization of coal units to satisfy residual demand, and 
emissions from natural gas units is represented by    g jk eu . With this notation, we measure the 
rebound effect as the difference between emissions that would occur if utilization depended on 
the baseline heat rate and the actual emissions, normalized by the former measure:  
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Heat Rate (mmBtu/MWh) 
Figure 1: Heat Input vs. Heat Rate (2008) 
Notes: The figure plots the heat input (million megawatt hours, MWh) against the heat rate 
(million Btu, mmBtu, per MWh) for all units in the sample in 2008. The vertical line indicates the 
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Heat Rate (mmBtu/MWh) 
Figure 2: Estimated Heat Rate Distribution by Firing Type 
All  Units Tangential Front Opposed
Notes: The figure plots the estimated heat rate kernel density function for all units and for the 
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Heat Rate (mmBtu/MWh) 
Figure 3: Estimated Heat Rate Distribution Controlling For Technology 
Variables 
No Controls Cogenerator Add Capacity Add Firing Type Add Fuel Type
Notes: The figure plots the estimated kernel density function of heat rates for 2008. The first series 
plots the function using the heat rates observed in the data set. To construct the other plots, each 
unit's heat rate is regressed on the indicated control variables. The figure plots the residuals after 
adding the mean heat rate across units in the sample. Figure 4: Utilization, Heat Rates, and Technology
Notes: Heat rate, h, is a function of utilization, u, and heat rate technology, T. The figure plots two 
hypothetical technologies, T1 and T2. The figure shows that at the same level of utilization, u2, the heat 
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Figure 5: Heat Rate vs. Coal Price Residuals 
Notes:  Heat rate and coal prices are obtained from a regression of log heat rate and log coal price 
on the control variables in column 1 of Panel A in Table 4, omitting the log coal price as an 
independent variable. The figure plots the heat rate residuals against the coal price residuals. The 
red line shows the fitted values from a regression of the heat rate residuals on the coal price 
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Panel B: With Fixed Effects 
Notes: The log coal price is interacted in a set of year fixed effects, and the interactions are added 
to the specification in column 1 of Table 4. The figure plots the effect of coal prices on heat rates 
for each year as the sum of the coefficient on the coal price and the coeffcient on the 
corresponding year-coal price interaction. The dashed curves show the 95 percent confidence 
intervals. In Panel A unit fixed effects are not included in the regression, and in Panel B, fixed 
effects are included. The vertical lines indicate the end of the first and second NSR regimes (see 
text). Determinant Hypotheses
Cogeneration
Traditional measures of heat rate do not account for the thermal output produced by 
cogenerators and are misleading.
Utilization
Higher utilization rates are associated with lower heat rates because it is less costly to run a 
more efficient plant and there are efficiency losses associated with varying utilization and 
with starting up and shutting down the unit.
Pollution 
Controls
Pollution controls impose a heat rate penalty because of the heat input or electricity 
required to run them.  Also, investment in pollution controls may crowd out other 
investments.
Fuel Choice
Low sulfur coal is associated with increased efficiency because it reduces the need for 
pollution controls. However, low sulfur (sub-bituminous) coal also has  a higher rate of CO2 
emission per BTU than high sulfur (bituminous) coal. Coal type may also signal an economic 
decision based on location and availability.
Regulation and 
Incentives
Fear of triggering NSR for other pollutants may delay efficiency improvements. Fuel cost 
adjustment clauses allow plants to pass through fuel costs to customers, which may reduce 
incentives for making efficiency improvements. Competition in wholesale markets 
incentivizes efficiency improvements.
Ownership
Competition in wholesale power markets provides an incentive for efficiency improvements.
Table 1
The Determinants of Heat Rates Associated with How Boilers are UsedNumber of 
Observations





22.4 314.6 0.48 0.13 10.9 1.57
(11.1) (259.1) (0.19) (1.6) (0.40)
26.9 319.7 0.51 0.14 10.8 1.45
(11.4) (262.0) (0.19) (1.5) (0.37)
31.7 323.5 0.57 0.17 10.8 1.29
(11.6) (267.4) (0.18) (1.4) (0.32)
36.0 324.9 0.62 0.20 10.9 1.30
(11.7) (269.0) (0.16) (1.4) (0.31)
39.9 337.1 0.60 0.30 11.0 2.01
(12.4) (275.7) (0.18) (1.5) (0.65)
Notes: The table preports summary statistics for all units in the sample. Observations are aggregated to five-year time intervals by taking generation-
weighted means over years. The table reports the number of observations in each time period and the means of the variables indicated in the column 
headings; standard deviations are in parentheses. Age is reported in years and capacity in MW. Utilization rate is total generation divided by generation 
if the unit operates at full capacity throughout the time period. The scrubber variable is an indicator for whether the unit is connected to a scrubber. 
Heat rat is reported in mmBtu/MWh. Coal price is in dollars per mmBTU. 
Table 2











Standard by Firing 
Type
Standard by Firing 
Type and Size
Standard by Firing 
Type, Size, and 
Scrubber
Standard by Firing 
Type, Size, Scrubber, 
and Cogenerator
5.84 5.92 6.87 6.34 6.29
4.72 4.79 5.56 5.13 5.09
Table 3
Estimated Abatement Opportunities for Traditional Emissions Rate Standards
Panel A: Percent Abatement Without Rebound Effect
Panel B: Percent Abatement With Rebound Effect
Notes: The table reports abatement opportunties under different hypothetical emissions rate standards. The 
calculations do not account for abatement costs or technical constraints, but capture only the heterogeneous 
operating performance of existing coal generators. The standards are defined as the 10th percentile heat rate 
for the indicated categories (i.e., 90 percent of units initially have a higher heat rate than the standard). Size 
categories are assigned based on the unit's quartile of generation capacity. Scrubber and cogenerator categories 
are assigned based on whether the unit has a scrubber or whether the unit is a cogenerator. Panel A assumes 
that the standards do not affect generation and Panel B assumes that a 10 percent heat rate decrease causes a 2 












R-Squared 0.93 0.95 0.95
Specification Baseline Include 10 Largest Firms Include 20 Largest Firms
Table 4
Effect of Coal Prices on Heat Rates
Dependent Variable: Log Heat Rate
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (3), in which α is the coefficient on the log coal price. Standard 
errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state. The unit of observation is a generation unit by 5-year time period 
from 1985-2009. The dependent variable is the log of heat input divided by generation over the time period. Log 
coal price is the log of the average price of coal for the corresponding plant and time period. Utilization is the 
total generation of the unit over the time period divided by the unit's capacity multiplied by the number of 
hours in the time period. All specifications include utilization; separate indicator variables for whether the unit is 
a cogenerator, whether the unit has SCR, and whether the unit has a scrubber; age fixed effects; period fixed 
effects; firing type fixed effects; fuel type fixed effects; state fixed effects; and ownersip type fixed effects. 
Deciles are constructed for the unit's rated capacity, and all specifications include a set of fixed effets for each 
capacity decile. All specifications include a set of fixed effects for the number of months in the time period that 
the unit operates at below 10 percent or below 30 percent of rated capacity. Panel B also includes unit fixed 
effects. Each column reports the indicated specification. Columns 2 and 3 included the 10 or 20 largest firms, 
where firms are ranked by total coal capacity in 2009.
Log Coal Price (α)
Panel A: No Unit Fixed Effects
Panel B: Unit Fixed Effects
Log Coal Price (α)Dep var: log coal price
Dep var: log contract 
price

















Notes: Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state. The unit of observation is a generation 
unit by 5-year time period from 1985-2009. The dependent variable is the average price of coal in 
column 1, the contract price in column 2, and the spot price in column 3. Each regression includes 
the one-period lag of the corresponding price. All specifications include period fixed effects, and 
Panel A also includes state fixed effects.
Panel A: Include State Fixed Effects
Panel B: Omit State Fixed Effects











4,527 4,927 4,527 4,777 4,361
























Use coal price in 
first year of time 
period
Interact coal 





Dependent Variable: Log Heat Rate
Panel A: No Unit Fixed Effects
Log Coal Price
Panel B: Unit Fixed Effects
Log Coal Price
Log Spot Price
Notes: The table reports the same specifications as column 1 of Table 4, except as noted in the bottom row of 
the table. The first column replaces the log average coal price with the log spot price and log contract price. 
Column 2 repeats column 1 of Table 2 except that state fixed effects are omitted. Column 3 repeats column 1 
omitting state fixed effects. Column 4 uses the coal price in the first year of the corresponding time period in 
place of the average price over the period. For the five NERC regions with the most coal units, the coal price 
persistence is estimated using the same specification as column 1 in Panel A of Table 5. Column 5 includes the 





Log Coal Price 
X Peristence
Log Coal Price 
X Peristence
Log Spot Price(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-0.050 -0.052 -0.061 -0.078 -0.015 -0.046 -0.009
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Number of 
Observations
3,414 4,275 4,807 4,807 4,807 3,908 3,908

















Column (6) plus 
unit fixed 
effects
Notes: Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state. See Table 2 for sample and variable construction. All specifications include the 
same unreported control variables as in Table 4. Column 1 includes units whose median utilization across all periods exceeds 0.5. Column 2 
includes units that operate in all time periods. Column 3 includes parent company fixed effects. Column 4 includes parent company by period 
fixed effects. Column 5 adds to column 4 unit fixed effects. Column 6 includes total capacity, coal capacity, natural gas capacity, total generation, 
coal generation, natural gas generation, gross state product, employment, and population by state and period, where all variables are in logs. 
Column 7 adds to column 6 unit fixed effects.
Table 7
Time-Varying Omitted Variables
Dependent Variable: Log Heat Rate
Log Coal Price(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.458 -0.400 -0.418 -0.348 -0.250
(0.070) (0.092) (0.079) (0.074) (0.059)
Number of 
Observations
21,690 8,494 11,264 4,927 6,043
R-Squared 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.87
-0.398 -0.408 -0.415 -0.365 -0.171
(0.043) (0.067) (0.064) (0.088) (0.054)
Number of 
Observations
21,690 8,494 11,264 4,927 6,043









Log Coal Price 
(β)
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (4), in which β is the coefficient on the log coal price. 
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state. Specifications in columns 1-3 are identical to Table 
4, except that the dependent variable is the log of the utilizaiton rate, utilization controls are omitted, and 
observations are annual rather than aggregated to five-year time periods. Column 4 uses 5-year time 
intervals. Column 5 is the same as column 1 except that it includes only observations from 2001-2009.
Table 8
Effect of Coal Prices on Utilization Rates
Dependent Variable: Log Utilization Rate
Log Coal Price 
(β)
Panel B: Unit Fixed Effects
Panel A: No Unit Fixed Effects(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.277 -0.324 -0.385 -0.399 -0.388 -0.363 -0.260 -0.452
(0.033) (0.050) (0.048) (0.063) (0.049) (0.077) (0.044) (0.070)
Number of 
Observations
15,016 13,823 21,222 21,202 21,222 16,798 16,798 21,534























plus unit fixed 
effects
Add natural 
gas price to 
baseline
Table 9
Utilization: Time-Varying Omitted Variables
Dependent Variable: Utilization Rate
Log Coal Price
Notes: Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state. Specifications in columns 1-7 are identical to Table 7, except that the dependent 
variable is the log of the utilizaiton rate, utilization controls are omitted, and observations are annual rather than aggregated to five-year time 
periods. Column 8 adds to the baseline from Table 8 the log of the state's natural gas price.Traditional 
Standard
Flexible Standard Coal Btu Tax Emissions Tax
Percent Change in Heat Rates -1.00 -1.01 -0.16 -0.18
Percent Change in Coal Generation 0.19 0.21 -1.11 -1.09
Percent Change in Coal Emissions -0.82 -0.81 -1.27 -1.26
Change in Investment Costs 
(million $)
709.0 343.0 50.1 55.1
Change Investment Costs/Change 
Emissions ($/ton)
-54.71 -26.48 -3.87 -4.25
Capacity Factor (percent) 60.71 60.72 59.93 59.94
Rebound in Emissions per Change 
in Emissions
0.13 0.15 0.02 0.02
Table 10
Policy Impacts
Notes: The table reports results of simulations of the electricity market model. See text and Appendix 3 for a 
detailed description of the model. Each column reports the results of a separate policy scenario. The scenarios 
are calibrated to achieve the same total emissions reduction. Under the inflexible standard units must achieve a 
heat rate of 10.78 mmBtu/MWh or reduce heat rate by 10 percent, whichever results in a higher heat rate. The 
flexible standard sets a benchmark heat rate of 10.26 mmBtu/MWh. The coal Btu tax imposes a tax of $0.115 
per mmBtu of coal. The emissions tax is $1.13 per ton of CO2 emissions. Each row reports the change in the 
indicated variable as compared to the baseline (no policy) case. Investment costs include the annualized capital 
costs of heat rate improvements using a fixed charge rate of 0.1. Capacity factor is the ratio of generation of the 
coal units to the generation if all units operated at full capacity. The rebound in emissions is the change in 
emissions resulting from the change in heat rates, holding fixed the effective coal price under each policy (see 
appendix 4 for details on the rebound calculation).